14.123 Microeconomic Theory III

Spring 2009

An example of a Cournot duopoly. A graph of q2 versus q1 with two intersecting lines B1(q2) and B2(q1).
An example of a Cournot duopoly. After several rounds of elimination, the rationalizable outcome is approximated. (Image by Prof. Peter Eso.)

Course Description

This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics, background risk, game theory, rationalizability, iterated strict dominance multi-stage games, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfection, stability, signaling games, theory of auctions, global games, repeated games, and correlation.
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Staff

Instructor:
Prof. Peter Eso

Course Meeting Times

Lectures:
2 sessions / week
1.5 hours / session

Recitations:
1 session / week
1.5 hours / session

Level

Graduate